Sanctions Warfare: Does Maximum Pressure Work?
In 2019, after the Trump administration withdrew from JCPOA, it launched the so-called “Maximum Pressure” campaign—the largest-scale sanctions in history against Iran. What were the goals of this economic war? What were the results?
The Scale of Sanctions
Current US sanctions on Iran cover:
- Financial: All transactions with Iran’s central bank were cut off; Iran was expelled from the SWIFT system
- Energy: Iranian oil exports dropped from ~2.5 million barrels per day to under 200,000
- Shipping: Any port globally that receives Iranian tankers faces secondary sanctions
- Individuals: Hundreds of Iranian officials and IRGC commanders placed on sanctions lists
EU and UN sanctions were suspended during JCPOA but reactivated after America’s unilateral withdrawal.
What Are the Goals of Sanctions?
There is fundamental ambiguity here: The goals of sanctions have never been clearly defined.
If the goal is to change Iran’s behavior (abandon nuclear program, stop proxy support):
- Evidence: Failure. Iran did not concede under sanctions pressure—instead, it accelerated nuclear activities and expanded regional influence
If the goal is to weaken Iran’s economy and destabilize the regime:
- Evidence: Partial success at high cost. Iran’s GDP contracted significantly, but the regime shows no signs of collapse—and has instead strengthened anti-American mobilization
If the goal is to demonstrate America’s protective power to allies:
- Evidence: Moderate success. Saudi Arabia and Israel welcomed sanctions, but regional allies are increasingly aware: sanctions cannot replace America’s direct military presence
What Do the Economic Data Tell Us?
Iran’s response: Resistive Economy. The Iranian government’s strategy was to strengthen domestic circulation:
- Drastically reduced import dependence, especially consumer goods
- Developed alternative industries like petrochemicals and pharmaceuticals
- Expanded trade with non-Western countries (Russia, China, Iraq, UAE)
Results:
| Indicator | Pre-sanctions (2017) | Post-sanctions (2023) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Oil exports | ~2.5M barrels/day | ~200K barrels/day | -92% |
| GDP (USD billions) | ~440 | ~370 | -16% |
| Inflation rate | ~10% | ~40% | +30pp |
| Rial exchange rate (per USD) | 1:32,000 | 1:600,000 | -94% |
The economy was indeed severely impacted, but the regime did not collapse. Why:
- Crisis solidarity effect — External sanctions strengthened nationalist sentiment, actually helping the regime mobilize public support
- Shadow economy — IRGC-controlled networks can bypass sanctions and continue import-export operations
- Chinese buffer — China is Iran’s largest trading partner and does not participate in America’s sanctions regime
Systematic Side Effects of Sanctions
Sanctions don’t only affect Iran—they generate a series of unintended consequences:
Disruption to global oil markets: Limiting Iranian exports intensified oil price volatility, actually benefiting other oil producers like Russia
Impact on Iranian citizens: Sanctions hit the living standards of ordinary people at the economic bottom, but had limited impact on elites—this often strengthens rather than weakens authoritarian rule
Collateral damage to allies: European companies were forced to exit the Iranian market, losing tens of billions in investments
Long-Term Perspective
Historical data shows that economic sanctions have extremely low success rates in toppling regimes (multiple studies show under 30%). The Iran case再次印证了这一规律:一个有足够资源、有动员能力的政权,可以在严厉制裁下存活数十年(古巴、朝鲜、委内瑞拉都是先例)。
美国制裁的真正效果,也许不是改变伊朗,而是向盟友展示美国愿意为其安全付出经济代价——这是一种盟友投资的"承诺机制",而非单纯的政策工具。

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