Military Friction: The Strait of Hormuz and the Edge of War
Among all US-Iran military tensions, the Strait of Hormuz is the most dangerous scenario. This waterway, just 29 nautical miles wide, is the passage for 20% of global oil transportation—and the most frequent site of US-Iran military confrontation.
The Strategic Logic of the Strait
Iran knows it would lose in direct military confrontation with America, but at the Strait of Hormuz, Iran holds asymmetric advantage.
Iran’s “Anti-Access/Area Denial” (A2/AD) capabilities include:
- Short-range ballistic missiles: CSS-N-4 and Nasr anti-ship missiles capable of targeting surface vessels
- Mines: Rapid mining capability to seal the strait in early conflict
- Fast attack craft: Mass-deployed “wolf pack” tactics
- Submarines: Russian Kilo-class submarines capable of operating in shallow waters
- Drone swarms: Iran’s large deployments of reconnaissance and attack drones in recent years
The US aircraft carrier battle groups are not safe in the Persian Gulf—this is important leverage at Iran’s negotiating table.
Major Military Incidents in Recent Years
June 2019: US Global Hawk drone shot down. Iran shot down a US RQ-4A Global Hawk surveillance drone over the Strait of Hormuz, just 34 kilometers from Iranian airspace. US military fighters were preparing to retaliate, but Trump called off the strike at the last moment.
January 2020: Soleimani assassination. US forces used an MQ-9 Reaper drone to fire Hellfire missiles at Baghdad airport, assassinating IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani. This was the first time since the Cold War that the US carried out a “targeted killing” of a foreign military’s top commander. Iran responded by launching short-range ballistic missiles at US bases in Iraq—but deliberately avoided American casualties.
Since 2022: Maritime seizures and tanker conflicts. Iran has repeatedly seized or interfered with foreign tankers in the Persian Gulf. The US faces a dilemma in response: military retaliation could escalate; not retaliating appears weak.
Why Hasn’t War Broken Out?
Over the past 45 years, US-Iran military confrontations have approached the brink of war multiple times, but ultimately never exploded. The reason: both sides have strong incentives for “escalation control.”
Iran’s calculation:
- Knows military conflict means defeat; proxy warfare is the only viable option
- Needs to maintain reputation for “resisting but not provoking devastating war”
- The existence of nuclear deterrence limits America’s military options to some extent
America’s calculation:
- Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan wars: Iran is not an opponent that can be “defeated”
- Allies (Israel, Saudi Arabia) demand American protection, but don’t want America to “play with fire” in Iran
- Oil price risk: Any action to blockade the Strait of Hormuz would cause global oil prices to soar, damaging the US and global economy
The role of China and Russia: China and Russia are Iran’s major economic partners, and neither wants large-scale conflict in the Persian Gulf. 60% of China’s oil imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz—Beijing has incentive to prevent military escalation.
The Real Risk of Accidental Escalation
Even if neither side wants war, the risk of accidental escalation remains:
Signal recognition errors: In the 2019 Global Hawk incident, radar operators may have misidentified the aircraft’s nationality and intentions
Proxy blowback: Iran’s proxies in Iraq and Syria are forces the Iranian government cannot fully control—localized conflicts could spiral out of control
“Insurance” behavior by US allies: Israel’s unilateral airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities could be a “third front” beyond US control
Stabilization Mechanisms
A set of unofficial “brinkmanship management” mechanisms exists between the US and Iran:
- Diplomatic signal channels: Information relayed through third parties like Switzerland
- Limited restoration of military dialogue: Indirect talks between the two sides in Oman in 2023 on maritime security
- Nuclear negotiation framework: Vienna talks served as a “conflict buffer” to some extent
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